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Abstract:  
A quarter of a century has passed since neo-liberal economic policies were first adopted in India in 1991 and it 
is timely to review their outcome. The study is important because there currently seems to be a gap in the 
literature, since most published research has highlighted India’s overall GDP growth rates. In the post-planning 
reform period, India reduced the role of the state and public sector, and dismantled controls, while increasing the 
role of the market and private sector within the economy. As a result, foreign capital investment and foreign 
exchange reserves improved. The study intends to examine what happened to the industrial sector after 
neoliberalism was adopted. This article primarily focuses on the discourse about neoliberal economic policy and 
its effects on Indian economy, especially in the context of sectoral change. The article centres on a critical 
review of the available literature and a contribution to the substantive topics indicated in the title. The study 
contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the industrial and the agricultural sector, which has been 
neglected by the mainstream economists, who have focused largely on growth rates.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this article is to analyse the pro-market economic reforms in India and, at the 
same time, to consider its performance and its limitations. It will also discuss the economic 
rationale for neoliberal reforms. The Indian economy has a very high average annual GDP 
growth of 7% per annum, and is an impressively vibrant democracy; where parliamentary 
elections are regularly hold. However, these appearances can be misleading.  
 
A quarter of a century has passed since liberal policies were first adopted in India in 1991 and 
it is timely to review their outcome. There has been a considerable rise in the inflow of 
capital and in exports, but imports have also risen. Foreign investment is not taking place in 
Indian manufacturing, as was the case in China; instead, foreign capital has largely been 
invested in services, urban property and speculative activities (Siddiqui, 2017a). 
 
Oil prices rose in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the Soviet Union 
collapsed in 1991, the same year India experienced a balance of payment crisis. This crisis 
led them to ask the IMF for an emergency loan in 1991, and there was a shift in Indian policy 
towards foreign capital (Nayyar, 2017). Economic liberalisation was launched by the 
Congress government following the 1991 economic crisis, although pro-market policies had 
already been started in the early 1980s. However, as a result of the severe economic crisis in 
1991, the government opted for a quick break from dirigiste policies in favour of economic 
liberalisation. In May 1991, India’s reserves amounted to barely three weeks’ worth of 
imports and foreign investor confidence was also at rock bottom. Under these circumstances, 
the government approached the IMF, pledging its gold reserves. As part of the bailout 
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conditions, the IMF imposed an economic liberalisation programme (also known as 
Washington Consensus)
2
 which included the usual measures: privatisation, a greater role for 
market forces, relaxation of the licence-permit raj (licence-permit regime) more openness to 
foreign investment and financial deregulation (Joshi and Little, 1994). 
 
Yeldan’s study (2006) on Turkey’s IMF-led economic reforms is very relevant to this current 
study on very similar IMF-led economic reforms in India. Turkey introduced a structural 
adjustment programme (SAP) nearly a decade earlier than India and it would be interesting to 
look at its experience. “[SAP] was marked by commodity trade liberalization and export 
promotion along with price reform aimed at reducing the state’s role in economic 
affairs....This policy manoeuvre paved the way for injection of liquidity into the domestic 
economy in terms of short-term foreign capital (flow of “hot money”). Such inflows, enabled, 
on the one hand, financing the accelerated public sector expenditures, and provided, on the 
other hand, relief from the increased pressures of aggregate demand on domestic markets by 
way of the cheapening costs of imports…[also] gave rise to significant shifts in income 
distribution and to an intensification of the on-going processes of transfer of the economic 
surplus from the industrial/real sectors and wage labor, in particular, towards the financial 
sectors” (Yeldan, 2006:199). Who further notes that: “Consequently, finance was elevated 
over industry and the real sphere of the economy, and the financial sector drifted to the 
speculation of short-term capital flows in a process that has been characterised as casino 
capitalism” (Yeldan, 2006:201). 
 
In 2015-16 the Indian economy grew faster at 7% annually than it had done for the two 
previous years. This equals China’s growth rate and is much faster than that of other BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). In fact, both Brazil and Russia 
experienced negative growth rates for the same period (Siddiqui, 2016a). By way of 
comparison, the GDP growth rate in developed countries was about 2% for 2015-16, while 
developing countries on average grew about 4.4% for the same period. This means India’s 
growth rate was impressive. However, if we consider a longer period, then the picture is less 
impressive because this growth rate is not consistent and has been much slower in the past 
(Patnaik, 2015). 
 
In order to understand fully the liberal reform of 1991, it is necessary to remember India’s 
economic situation in the previous decade. During the 1980s, the government faced a 
mounting fiscal crisis and was also keen to increase government spending, and consequently 
decided to borrow from overseas. As Nayyar notes:  
It [economic crisis] was triggered by an increase in world crude oil prices, following 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This minor oil shock was the proverbial 
last straw that broke the camel’s back […] The balance of payments situation became 
almost unmanageable. The fear of acceleration in the rate of inflation loomed large 
[…] Growing agitation on reservations for Other Backward Classes compounded 
problems. Even so, in early October 1990, [V.P.] Singh [then India’s Prime Minister] 
authorised initiating negotiations with the IMF […] on the realisation that India was 
close to defaulting on its international payments obligations and an understanding that 
the IMF was needed not simply as a lender of last resort but also for its imprimatur 
essential to restore international confidence (Nayyar, 2017:42). 
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In July 1991 an exchange rate adjustment was made and as a result, the Indian rupee 
depreciated by 23.3% to the US dollar. Other measures were taken to reduce fiscal deficit 
sharply, which in turn led to a steep rise in fuel prices while subsidies for fertilizers and food 
were drastically reduced. The government proclaimed that the pro-market policies would 
increase economic growth, efficiency and competition. Under IMF’s liberalisation 
programme, the government decided to substantially reduce the role of the state, placing 
greater reliance on market forces. This meant that the role of the public sector in production 
and investment was significantly reduced. In addition, the economy was open to foreign 
investment and trade, and technology. Thus, it seems that the focus was on the supply side 
only (Girdner and Siddiqui, 2008). 
 
It was claimed that adopting these liberal policies would not only solve the balance of 
payments crisis, but that foreign capital would bring new technology and enhance India’s 
international competitiveness and, consequently, would rapidly increase exports. (Joshi and 
Little, 1994) However, little attention was paid to the fact that imports of foreign technology 
could be capital-intensive and labor-displacing rather than creating jobs and would certainly 
not prove to be a substitute for domestic technological capabilities.  
 
It seems that with the removal of restrictions on imports of technology, the foreign firms will 
find it more attractive to setup collaborative enterprises, and will boost domestic production 
along with foreign capital, technology and management skills. Another important factor that 
contributed towards increased inflows of capital was due to further capital liberalisation 
measures taken by the government. Such measures provided opportunities for retail lending 
in portfolios of Indian commercial banks. Suddenly, the influx of foreign capital provided 
excessive liquidity in the system, which could be lent to consumers to purchase houses, 
automobiles and consumer durables. These credits were also extended without any collateral 
and on the basis of speculative projections of borrowers’ current earning profiles. Such 
individuals often borrowed excessive money from multiple sources without revealing that to 
the creditors. The availability of external funds resulted in an increase in debt-finance 
demand in the 1990s. As Chandrasekhar (2013:20) notes: “even the rate of overall and 
industrial growth during the 1990s was not very different from that in the 1980s, there was 
evidence of an incipient change in the regime of accumulation. There were two aspects to this 
change. The first was that private consumption expenditure on manufactured consumption 
goods and private investment in housing began to play a more important (relative to public 
expenditure) in driving demand and growth. Second, associated with this were signs that 
debt-financed private consumption expenditure was displacing debt-financed public 
expenditure as a leading stimulus for growth”. 
  
However, it seems that on the growth front, the turning point in India’s economic growth 
came in the 1950s and 1980s, not in the 1990s. The liberalisation did contribute to increase in 
growth rates from the mid-1990s onwards and, in addition, the world economic boom helped 
India’s economy to maintain growth rates for a longer period from 2003 to 2007. India 
benefited from reforms largely due to the essential foundations that had been built during the 
preceding decades of the pre-reform period. (Rodrik, 2011) However, in two crucial areas, 
India’s reforms were far less satisfactory, namely, in the agricultural sector and in the 
manufacturing. The most important failure of the liberal reforms has been that despite high 
economic growth, job creation has been negligible. The open economy and liberalisation of 
the new technology meant importing foreign technology, which had a job-displacing effect 
rather than creating employment (Nagaraj, 2017). 
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The other crucial failure has been the persistence of mass poverty. If we accept the official 
data on poverty, then rapid growth has not made much impression on the number of poor 
people. Official data indicates that in 2011-12 at least 25% of India’s 1.2 billion inhabitants 
were living in absolute poverty. It should not be forgotten that in 2012, one-third of the 
world’s poor were living in India. Finally, inequality has risen sharply during the market 
reform period. For example, between 1991 and 2010, the Gini coefficient of consumption 
inequality based on NSSO (National Sample Survey Office) data rose from 29.6 to 36.8 
(Nayyar, 2017). 
 
In the light of the recent study by Dani Rodrik (2016) there is a need to revisit the issue of 
industrialisation, which is still very important for creating employment, diversifying the 
economy and removing low productivity workforce from agriculture. However, according to 
this study, the increased global integration and liberalisation has led to de-industrialisation in 
some developing countries. It is very important for a country like India to draw some lessons 
from such a potentially adverse impact, which could be a huge destabilising factor. Another, 
important point is that the blind and open technology imports from advanced economies may 
be less suitable for developing economies like India as technologies currently in use in 
advanced economies are labour saving and capital using and hence are not meant to create 
employment. While on the contrary, India needs to create a large number of jobs in the 
industrial sector, due to persistence of high levels of unemployment and growing population 
(Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2015).  
 
For a heavily populated country such as India, the manufacturing sector still seems to be the 
only path which the traditional economy can take in order to secure better living conditions 
for the people. Therefore, industrialisation is seen as being crucial to transforming a 
backward economy with low productivity (Nicholas, 2005). By this, we do not mean to 
suggest that the solution lies in the type of industrialisation that is likely to create 
environmental and ecological crisis. However, this particular discussion lies outside the scope 
of this study. Instead, the focus is on analysing the importance of the industrial sector in 
India. There seems to be a gap in the literature because most research has chosen to highlight 
the overall GDP growth rates of the Indian economy (Srinivasan, 1993), but little has been 
written about the industrial sector’s importance, performance and near stagnation in overall 
job creation since economic reforms were launched in 1991. India’s industrial sector has 
languished at around 16% of GDP (which is much less than that of China or any other 
country at India’s stage of economic development), 12% of the total workforce and about 
three-quarters of the merchandise exports. Over the past six decades the manufacturing sector 
has grown on average over 6% per annum, representing a major breakthrough since the end 
of colonial rule (Bagchi, 1976). 
 
The manufacturing share in GDP was at its peak level of 17.3% in 1979-80, went down to an 
average of approximately 16% between 1995-96 and 2007-08, but thereafter declined to 
12.9% in 2014. (Nayyar, 2017) India’s share in value added goods and manufactured exports 
within the developing world has declined slowly since 1996-97; in contrast to this, China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have all seen their share of manufactured exports risen 
during the same period. The results from the manufacturing sector contradict the claims by 
mainstream economists that pro-market reforms in India would increase manufacturing 
output and efficiency (Routray, 2015).  
 
Despite the liberal reforms, India was unable to catch up with other East Asian economies, 
especially in building a viable manufacturing sector and increasing its share in manufactured 
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exports. There is no doubt that its services share has increased, but outsourcing has generated 
very little employment. The government is now talking about a “Made in India” campaign to 
raise manufacturing output so that it represents a 25% share of GDP by 2022. (Siddiqui, 
2016a) 
 
2. Crisis and the Policy Options 
 
The government portrayed this change in 1991 as a watershed in Indian policy making 
declaring that it is was removing the interventionist policy which had been in place since 
independence and had included regulation of markets and foreign capital, public sector 
building programmes, and a priori plan as to how economic resources should be allocated. 
With the launching of neoliberal reforms, the role of the government was minimised: instead 
of being the regulator of the market economy it became the facilitator of the market 
mechanism (Siddiqui, 2015). 
 
Soon after independence in 1950, the government saw maintaining some form of control on 
foreign capital as a prerequisite for ensuring long-term economic development and national 
sovereignty. India chose to pursue economic development with a highly regulated mixed 
economy, because it was realised that relying largely on market and private investors to 
allocate resources would not help what was then a backward colonial economy with very low 
productivity and mass poverty to achieve its aims (Patnaik, 2014). These were to diversify its 
economic activity, to catch up with the developed countries and also to improve living 
conditions for the majority of the population who were facing extreme poverty and 
deprivation. At that time it was considered that regulating and disciplining large landholders 
and industrialists would prevent them from pursuing profit to the detriment of social benefits. 
India’s post-independence industrial policy was based on import-substitution industrialisation 
from1950 to1991. Putting this into a more historical perspective, in the first half of the 20
th
 
century, prior to independence, India’s GDP growth rate was very low, at less than 0.9% 
annually. However, after independence, its economy grew at about 4% per annum, which was 
much higher than in the earlier period, but still lower than other East Asian economies 
(Patnaik, 2013a). 
 
Since the early 1980s, India’s rich, including the urban middle classes who had been direct 
beneficiaries of past government intervention and the public sector, had become disillusioned 
with the slow growth and looked towards global capital for a solution to this impasse. Policy 
options such as increased borrowing from global capital markets in the 1980s and increased 
integration with global finance were seen as the only available options. At the same time, the 
credit-led boom in the advanced economies from the 1990s until 2008 meant that India 
benefited from a rise in export demands and foreign capital inflows, which created local 
asset-market bubbles (Rodrik, 2011; Stiglitz, 2010). 
 
In the mid-1980s the government began to rely increasingly on external borrowing to cover 
its rising deficits. However, a major U-turn in economic policy occurred in May 1991 when 
India decided to approach the IMF for a bail-out and, in return, the IMF recommended the 
adoption of a ‘structural adjustment programme’ i.e. economic liberalisation. Economic 
liberalisation involves adopting more open trade and capital accounts policies. The economic 
liberalisation policy was fully supported by the mainstream economists and international 
financial institutions. T.N. Srinivasan, a proponent of economic liberalisation noted:   
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“They [the reforms] were solidly based on an understanding of what went wrong with 
Indian development strategy since 1950 that delivered neither rapid growth nor 
appreciably greater equity”. (Srinivasan, 1993: 258) 
 
Similar views were expressed by Jagdish Bhagwati who identified the three main policy 
factors that stifled India’s growth and efficiency as: “extensive bureaucratic controls over 
production, investment and trade; inward looking trade and foreign investment policies, and a 
substantial public sector, going well beyond the conventional confines of public utilities and 
infrastructure” (Bhagwati, 1993:48). Others, such as Joshi and Little argued that India’s 
industrial policy was responsible for its persistent fiscal deficits and periodic balance of 
payment crises. In their opinion, “India’s control system was not only micro-economically 
inefficient but macro-economically perverse” (Joshi and Little, 1994:3). However, those 
developing countries that underwent neo-liberal reforms including financial de-regulation 
found themselves trapped with high levels of interest rates and increased attacks of 
speculative hot money flows into real estate property and financial sectors, rising never-
ending spiral of consumers’ debts, and increased dependence on imports and jobless growth 
(Siddiqui, 1998). 
 
The adoption of neo-liberal policies was expected to raise levels of competition in the Indian 
economy and to make domestic firms more competitive with the increased presence of 
foreign firms and technology. It was said that market-friendly policies would facilitate an 
outward-oriented export-led growth trajectory. However, the fact that restructuring the 
capacities of domestic industries requires time was ignored as was the fact that building a 
reputation among customers and expanding markets takes even longer. In short, increasing 
exports is a complex task, while trade liberalisation immediately pushes up imports, as the 
elite’s demand for consumer goods increases. This led to the widening of the trade and 
current account deficit in the balance of payments (Siddiqui, 2016b). 
 
Economic success is measured by international institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank 
and the WTO, which support neoliberal reforms and measure success in terms of the 
confidence that foreign investors have in the Indian economy. This is judged by the amount 
of foreign capital inflows, especially finance capital coming into the country (Stiglitz, 2010; 
Rodrik, 2002). Since the adoption of economic liberalisation, inflows of foreign capital have 
risen sharply. For instance, in 1991 total foreign investment was just US$ 100 million, which 
rose to US$ 3 billion in 1993-94. This was due to a sharp increase in portfolio flows into 
equity and debt markets in India. Foreign investment rose further to US$ 5 billion in 1996-97 
and then rapidly declined due to the East Asian financial crisis in 1997. However, foreign 
capital inflows soon started to rise again and reached the same levels as during the pre-1997 
peak. In 2003-04 the rules were further relaxed and incentives were extended to foreign 
investors, with long-term tax on capital gains being abolished, which made India a virtual tax 
haven. Foreign investment began to increase after 2003 and India was viewed as a favoured 
destination by foreign investors. Capital inflows had reached US$ 62 billion in 2007-08 at the 
time of global financial crisis, (Balakrishnan, 2010) and it reached to US$ 65 billion in 2015 
(Siddiqui, 2017a). Such a sharp increase would not have been possible without the relaxation 
in laws governing foreign capital and repatriation of profits from India. The sharp increase in 
non-debt inflows of foreign capital, especially in portfolio and foreign direct investment 
indicates a new trend. Initially, this coincided with the rise in the public expenditure in the 
late 1990s. But later on, government spending was not available with the adoption of fiscal 
conservatism (Chandrasekhar, 2013).  
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Certainly, in the post-reform period, and especially since 2003, the availability of excess 
capital has been used to finance India’s current account deficit; within foreign capital inflows, 
the portfolio component seems to be more volatile. This is not related to the development of 
the Indian economy. The increased flow of capital has produced a huge injection of liquidity 
into the economy, which has triggered a credit boom that has increased growth but this boom 
is riding on a credit bubble. For example, the ratio of bank credit to GDP in India increased 
from 22% to 60% between 2003 and 2015. This credit boom has diverted credit away from 
industries to personal loans used to obtain consumer goods and housing. This does not 
provide any relief to the poorer sections of society (Siddiqui, 2016a). 
 
In contrast, China accumulated substantial amounts of foreign exchange reserves due to long 
periods of surpluses on its current account. In short, India has not earned its foreign reserves 
as happened in China; rather, foreign investors choose to keep it in return for short-term 
higher returns and are eligible to repatriate their capital if and when they choose to do so. 
This development has increased India’s vulnerability and its reliance on foreign capital, 
especially finance capital which required the adoption of austerity policies to ensure that 
India remained an attractive destination for foreign capital. However, this policy measure 
may have a negative effect on the income of the majority of India’s population (Patnaik, 
2013a). 
 
 
 India China 
 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 
Agriculture 29.30 23.00 13.00 27.10 13.10 10.10 
Industry 26.90 26.10 26.30 41.30 45.90 46.60 
Manufacturing 16.70 16.40 14.20 32.70 32.10 29.60 
Services 43.80 50.50 55.50 31.20 41.00 45.10 
Table 1: Structure of the Economy (% of GDP) 
Source: World Bank, 2016. 
 
The sectoral composition of the economy has been excessively weighted in favour of services 
and excessively against the agricultural sector (See Table 1). India’s industrial sector’s 
percentage share to GDP slightly declined from 26.90% in 1990 to 26.30% in 2015. In 
contrast to India’s, China industrial share to GDP has not only been higher, but also has risen 
from 41.30 to 46.80 for the same period (Siddiqui, 2017b; Routray, 2015). 
 
Recent high growth rates were due to rapid growth in the service sector, driven by a 
worldwide boom in the IT sector. Meanwhile, the share of agriculture in the GDP has 
continued to decline, from 55% in 1950 to about 13% in 2015 (See Table 1).  Moreover, the 
share of incomes of those working in the services rose rapidly. The near stagnation in 
manufacturing in India and the relatively consistent income from this sector has meant that it 
continues to employ the same number of workers. The situation is described by the 
economists as “jobless growth” (Patnaik, 2013a). 
 
3. Development Theories 
 
During the post-war period a number of discussions took place about development theory. 
The major contributors in the developed countries were Ragnar Nurkse, Arthur Lewis, Joan 
Robinson, Nicholas Kaldor, and Albert Hirschman, to cite but a few. They were concerned 
with the development possibilities for countries with low levels of per capita incomes and 
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low productivity. Most of these countries were in Africa, Asia and Latin America and they 
had had a long period of colonial rule and also suffered from low investment, and widespread 
poverty and illiteracy. Nurkse (1953) argued that the key requirement in such underdeveloped 
economies would be the need for capital formation. Soon after Lewis (1954) suggested that in 
labor surplus economies, agricultural laborers working for subsistence wages could be 
transferred to manufacturing. The logic was that the labor could shift from a low productivity 
sector to one with greater productivity i.e. manufacturing. This would relieve the burden from 
agriculture and the share of industry in GDP would increase; as a consequence, the income in 
services would rise. Lewis (1954) focused on this transfer of labor from agriculture as a 
means of driving industrialisation and modernisation. For him, the agricultural sector would 
play a crucial role as a supplier of surplus labor to industry. It would supply inputs and raw 
materials to industry. Over time, the supply of agricultural surpluses would act as a driving 
force for industrial growth. However, Lewis appeared to be focusing only on the supply side 
of the problem and he did not discuss the demand side for the industrial goods. 
 
Neo-classical economists overlooked the experience of colonisation and economic 
transformation of the developing countries in the 19
th
 century and how these economic 
changes continue to impact on their present-day economies. The benefits that the 
industrialised countries derived from their colonial markets are ignored in neo-classical 
arguments (Krueger, 1987). The Colonies provided markets, supplied raw materials and 
cheap labor. The economic policies were formulated in the Colonies to suit the metropolis. 
For Britain, for example, the access to colonial markets provided assured markets for their 
manufactured goods but at the same time British protectionism ensured that Indian 
manufactured goods could not be sold into British markets. The supply of cheap raw 
materials from India minimised inflation in Britain. Until the end of the 19th century, nearly 
half of British exports consisted of cotton textiles, destined chiefly for India and China, 
ironically at the same time that these two countries were themselves experiencing de-
industrialisation, massive unemployment and poverty (Bagchi, 1976). 
 
In Britain, the traditional industries such as handicrafts faced destruction in the 19th century 
due to the rapid industrial development. However, the jobs created in the modern industries 
were much higher than those lost in their traditional counterparts. The experience in the 
Colonies including India was quite different. The British government used protective 
measures not only during the early years of the Industrial Revolution but right the way 
through until the 1840s, but similar protective measures were not available for Indian 
industries. In India, handloom weaving and hand-spinning constituted the largest handicraft 
industries, employing large numbers of workers, and the loss of these jobs had a very 
depressive effect on the whole economy. As Bagchi (1976:154) observes: “Within India 
herself, when de-industrialisation drove laborers to seek their living in agriculture, they faced 
a highly imperfect market, the most important complementary asset, land, being already 
concentrated in the hands of landlords”. 
 
In the colonies, David Ricardo’s ‘comparative advantage’ meant that they had to specialise in 
the production and export of raw materials. The adoption of these policies led to the 
perpetuation of mass poverty and famine in India for the whole of the 19th century and the 
first half of the 20th. India proved useful to Britain as the surplus extracted from India was 
used to settle its deficits with the other industrialised countries whose goods it had imported. 
During the period 1900-1946, India experienced near stagnation in per capita income, while 
GDP growth was minimal. Maddison estimated that growth in national output was only 0.9% 
per annum and per capita growth was dismal, being just 0.04% per annum (Maddison, 1995).  
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Neoliberals emphasise the benefits of free market, competition and efficiency and the role of 
individuals in determining economic outcomes. According to them, any distortions are 
associated with government intervention and regulation of markets and the crucial issue of 
aggregate employment determination. They argue that under the free market, prices of the 
factors of production adjust to ensure that all factors are fully employed. The economy self-
adjusts to full employment in the long-run. Any distortions by the government involving the 
use of monetary and fiscal policy to raise employment merely generate inflation. They 
maintain that economic development requires rapid GDP growth, which has a “trickle-down 
effect”, benefitting the poor. Finally, it is claimed that the higher growth rate generate large 
revenues for the state exchequer and thus enabling the government to invest more and create 
more jobs (Bhagwati, 1993). 
 
4. The Interlinkage between the Industrial and Agricultural Sector  
 
The growth of industry appears to be very important to economic growth and the well-being 
of the population of developing countries such as India. Nicholas Kaldor identified most 
critical issue is the ‘Laws of Economic Development’ in his book (1967) Strategic Factors in 
Economic Development. He views the wider impact of the manufacturing sector as follows: 
1) Higher growth in the manufacturing sectors can also lead to an increase in labor 
productivity; 2) Productivity in the non-manufacturing sector increases as the manufacturing 
sector expands; 3) Manufacturing is an engine of growth, not only because of higher 
productivity but also because of the external economies it generates, including forward and 
backward linkages; 4) As the manufacturing sector expands, it provides job opportunities for 
the surplus labor in the agricultural sector, which ultimately reduces levels of unemployment 
and poverty. Kaldor (1967) emphasised that the growth of agriculture surplus is an essential 
condition for increasing the purchasing power necessary for sustaining industrial expansion. 
For him, industrial growth depends on stimulus provided by demand from agriculture sector. 
In order to achieve sustained industrial growth, the terms of trade between agriculture and 
industry should be in favour of the former as it would benefit the latter through increased 
purchasing power. He observed that increasing agricultural productivity through 
technological innovation would generate a surplus that would keep food prices low, while 
increasing the demand for industrial goods.  
 
Industrialisation is important but the identity of the central actor driving the industrialisation 
process is equally important. Past experiences from various countries show that 
industrialisation is not merely an instrument of economic growth but also has an in-built 
mechanism for distributing the costs and benefits of growth. However, it seems that the 
opening up of domestic markets and free trade as strategies for industrialisation can be 
incompatible in the present circumstances for the late-industrialising countries. For example, 
South Korea is characterised by active state intervention in the economy and the 
accumulation process was sustained. State protection of certain strategic industries was 
considered necessary there in order to bring about a situation where integration with the 
world economy would lead to the development of industries and expansion in employment 
domestically (Amsden, 2003). 
 
During the last four decades, the rapid economic transformation of the East Asian countries 
has become the most important development in the world economy. For instance, 
development initially in Japan, then South Korea and most recently in China has been the 
most spectacular and the most widely discussed. However, proponents of ‘outward-looking’ 
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industrialisation policy overlook the differences among the East Asian countries that 
successfully followed this policy. For example, Japan and South Korea had almost no foreign 
direct investment capital flows, while Hong Kong, Singapore and more recently, China, have 
been dominated by inflows of foreign capital (Siddiqui, 2009). 
 
In the pre-liberalisation period from 1980-81 and 1990-91, the annual industrial growth was 
7.8%. By contrast, for the initial period of liberalisation i.e. 1990-91 to 2011-12, the 
industrial growth rate was 6.2%. This means the period of liberalisation is characterised by 
slower industrial growth rates than the preceding periods. Moreover, if we look at the entire 
pre- and post-liberalisation period industrial growth rates were slower in the latter period. For 
example, from 1950-51 to 1990-91 the entire period of dirigisme, industrial growth rate was 
on average 6.32% annually, while in the period 1990-91 to 2011-12 it was 6.28%, and even 
lower if we consider the post-2012 period (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: India’s Growth and Sectoral Share in GDP (2004-05 series) at constant prices, 
1950-2015. 
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, EPWRF India Time Series Database, 
http://www.epwrfits.in/index.aspx (accessed on 10 November, 2017). 
 
However, industrial slowdown or lower growth rates is not a new phenomenon in India. In 
the mid-1960s there was a period of industrial stagnation, when economists argued this was 
due to the drop in agricultural growth in 1965-67. During the mid-1960s the RBI (Reserve 
Bank of India) imposed two requirements on the banking sector: firstly, priority sector 
lending. This ensured that banks made a significant portion of their loans to farmers for 
agriculture and this also meant that small and medium farmers also were able to borrow at 
subsidized rates. The other was a statutory liquidity ratio, which determined the amount of 
government securities the banks had to hold as percentage of demand. This put a limit on the 
amount of money banks could create. This resulted in lower inflation, except in response to 
unfavourable oil shocks or poor weather conditions (Siddiqui, 2014).  
 
Under dirigisme, industrial production was associated with the performance of the agriculture 
sector. It was said that a poor harvest meant lower incomes for farmers who then had little 
money left to spend on industrial goods. (Siddiqui, 1999) At the same time, government cuts 
in expenditure to control inflation adversely affected industrial demands. In short, both 
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industrial demand and production were associated with the performance of the agricultural 
sector. 
 
In fact, the poor performance of agriculture has deepened, especially since the liberal reforms 
and also the productivity of the agricultural sector in India continues to lag behind other 
major countries. There is a need to rethink state support not only for industrialisation, but also 
for agriculture. As Kaldor (1967) has emphasised, faster growth in the manufacturing sector 
is associated with the performance of the agricultural sector. Successful East Asian countries 
also point towards the crucial developmental role played by the state. 
 
However, the current lower industrial growth or near stagnation seems to be different from 
the previous one. Industrial stagnation took place in both 2011-12 and 2013-14, when 
agricultural output was good, but the industrial growth rate did not increase. The good 
agricultural performance was expected to boost industrial output, but this did not happen. The 
post-liberalisation period has been marked by a new development, which is very different 
from the pre-liberalisation period, namely, the Indian economy is now much more closely 
integrated with the world economy (Patnaik, 2013a). 
 
5. The Performance of the Industrial Sector  
 
The manufacturing sector has been technologically a dynamic sector and absorbed large 
quantities of skilled labour migrating from the rural sector and also benefitted the economy 
by raising incomes and productivities. In the past manufacturing showed the way for rapid 
growth to the rest of the economy. However, recent globalization has led to 
deindustrialization within some developing countries. Due to this the share of the economy’s 
labour employed by the manufacturing sectors is less that unity (𝜎<1) (Rodrik, 2016). 
 
The arguments for industrial policy put forward by Kaldor (1967) that faster manufacturing 
sector growth propels the rest of the economy following Verdoon’s law of positive 
externalities. Industrialisation is crucial because it can absorb a huge labor force through 
employment creation, raise productivity, has spill-over effects on other sectors and can earn 
foreign exchange revenue. (Nicholas, 2005) India’s manufacturing output has risen 6% per 
annum since 1991, and there has certainly been improvement in the variety and quality of 
consumer goods produced locally. But import intensity has risen as well. The manufacturing 
growth rate is higher than for the preceding quarter century, but the same as in the 1980s, 
when some market-friendly measures were applied to boost private investment. In the 1980s, 
India began gradually to liberalise trade and by mid-1980s India’s current account deficit and 
external debt started to grow. And also imports grew at a faster rate and the rising current 
account deficit was increasingly financed by commercial borrowing and non-resident India 
(NIR) remittances, which meant greater dependence on foreign sources and higher costs and 
short-term financing. As a result, India’s foreign debt sharply rose from US$ 20.5 billion in 
1980 to US$ 72 billion in 1992, making India the world’s third largest debtor after Brazil and 
Mexico (Nagaraj, 2017). India’s share in global merchandise increased from 0.5% in 2000 to 
1.5% by 2015, while India’s share in the global of services rose faster over the same period 
i.e. from 1% to 3% (CSO, 2015). 
 
In the 1990s, India’s important manufacturing sector such as capital goods, heavy electricals 
and cotton textiles have experienced significant unutilised capacity due to lack of domestic 
demand for their products. The reason seems to be the price ratio between manufactured 
goods and agricultural commodities declined between 1991 and 1999. It is well known that 
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food enters in a significant way into the cost of living indices of agricultural workers and the 
rural poor, who constitute a significant proportion of the rural population. For instance, the 
agriculture cost of living index for agriculture was 114.14%, while industrial worker index 
cost of living rose to 110.4% between 1991 and 1999 (Patnaik, 2013b). Moreover, 
government expenditure declined as a proportion to GDP i.e. 36.96% in 1991 to 33.4% in 
1999. And also the ratio of development outlay to GDP declined from 22.1% to 18.5% for the 
same period, while the non-development outlay such as interest payments as a proportion of 
GDP rose from 5.2% to 6.2% between 1991 and 1999 (Siddiqui, 2015).  
 
In early 2000s, the rise of demand for IT services abroad has created IT services boom. As 
profits in this sector rose and it provided opportunities for further foreign capital investment 
collaborations in this sector. This period also coincided when India began to be seen as a 
favoured destination for foreign financial investors. This was also the period when Indian 
businesses went for excessive borrowings from foreign sources. Moreover, in recent years the 
capital inflows exceeded the balance of payments needs and it led to the creation of 
conditions for an appreciation of Indian currency. In fact, excessive foreign capital inflows 
have led to building surplus foreign exchange reserves, but these reserves are not earned 
through exports but are borrowed from foreign capital investors. It seems that such economic 
policies are fragile as its success heavily relies on foreign capital inflows, if such inflows 
reverse back due to external reasons or global situation, then it could lead to a similar 
situation as happened during the 1997 East Asian crisis.  
 
It seems that pro-market reforms have hardly had any long lasting impact on the 
manufacturing sector; its GDP share has stagnated at around 14% and that of the industrial 
sector at 26% during the post-reform period. India’s stagnation in the manufacturing sector is 
unique, compared with other East Asian economies, including China. These economies not 
only managed to raise their manufacturing share in domestic output and global trade, but also 
increased the technological content of their exports. (Rodrik, 2011)  
 
There is no doubt that Industrial production has diversified with improvements in the quality 
of the products. However, the manufacturing sector’s share has stagnated at about 15%, while 
the industrial share has stagnated at around 26% of GDP after the reforms. When we look at 
the longer trends, Indian industries have not done very well. For instance, when we compare 
with China, both countries had roughly same levels of industrialisation in the 1950s, India 
rather had slightly more developed industries than China, but by 2015, China became world’s 
second largest manufacturing country, while India ranked 10
th
, producing one-quarter of 
China’s industrial output (Nagaraj, 2017). Since reforms, the growth rate of the manufacture 
sector has averaged 7%, which is higher than the preceding quarter century, but almost 
similar as in the 1980s. India’s share in global merchandise trade has risen from 0.5% in 2000 
to 1.5% in 2016, and the share of services exports increased from 1% to 3% for the same 
period (Nagaraj, 2017). 
 
In 2000s, the Indian government initiated policies to promote industrialisation through the 
creation of SEZs (Special Economic Zones) and land acquisition for infra-structure and 
industrial development. They were made open to private and foreign capital, which led to 
land becoming commercialised with the backing of local and foreign capital and ultimately 
private developers took this over for residential and commercial purposes rather than 
industrial land use (Bhaduri, 2008). India has taken a number of policy measures to 
encourage investors and has reduced import tariffs. In terms of openness it is comparable to 
other East Asian countries. Then the question arises as to why India’s manufacturing output 
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and exports have not risen and are still performing poorly, in comparison with its East Asian 
peers.  
 
The proponents of liberal reform would say that those reforms have not gone far enough; as 
some restrictions still remain regarding foreign investment, and labor market regulation. 
However, there is no clear theoretical or empirical evidence to indicate a positive correlation 
between liberal market reforms, and output and export growth. (Rodrik, 2011) India’s pro-
market policy has led to an increase in capital inflow, largely in private equity investment.  
 
Following financial liberalisation, India has reduced the availability of credits to local 
businesses and large firms are allowed to borrow internationally. In contrast to India, China 
still provides cheap credit and trade credit to businesses wishing to enter the international 
market. Liberal reform has also led to the reduction in spending on domestic industrial R&D, 
in the hope that private and foreign firms would fill the gap, but this has not happened, while 
China has increased spending in this area as well. For example, in 1996, R&D represented the 
same share of GDP for both India and China, about 0.6%, but by 2011 the ratio for China had 
tripled, whereas India’s ratio has risen marginally to 0.8% (Siddiqui, 2014). It was also 
expected that the imposition of liberal (market-friendly) reforms would boost the labor-
intensive export sector and overall exports would rise. However, this did not happen 
(Bhaduri, 2008). 
 
6. The Performance of the Agricultural Sector  
 
The dirigiste economic strategy in the 1950s brought a very positive change in the industrial 
sector by building industries in key areas such as power generation, steel and manufacturing 
industries. However, it failed in achieving land reforms in the sense that curbing the rural 
power of the landlords and bringing socio-economic equality in the countryside. Despite of a 
number of land reform measures, it did not break the social and economic power of the 
landlords and also failed to fully implement ‘land to the tiller’ policy. The rural poor did not 
experience any betterment as the large number of these sections also belongs to the lower 
castes. During the mid-1960s, the government undertook measures to nationalise banks, 
which meant more credits were made available to agriculture sector and besides this subsidies 
were also extended to agriculture inputs to support ‘Green Revolution’. These measures did 
achieve to increase food production and not to rely on food imports. But such dirigiste 
strategy promoted capitalist development in agriculture. However, it reached into inner 
contradictions, especially fiscal crisis of the state. And in the 1980s the government resorted 
to foreign borrowing, which provided a short term relief. However, the Gulf War and decline 
in remittances from Indian workers in that region and a dramatic rise in oil prices and finally 
collapse of Soviet Union has created a very challenging situation for India (Chandrasekhar, 
2013). 
 
Growth in the agricultural sector in terms of both GDP and output had decelerated in the 
post-reform period. For example, from 3.08% during the 1980-1990, the agricultural growth 
declined to 2.57% during the period of 1992-2007 and in terms of output, the growth rate of 
food grains to 1.16% from 2.86% for the same period. It is alarming is that the food grains 
annual growth is far below the rate of population growth. The crisis in the agricultural sector 
is also related to the rise in the cost of production, decline in investments, capital formation, 
access to poor credits and poor selling prices (Siddiqui, 1999). The decontrol of fertilizers led 
to sharp increase in its prices. Table 2 analyses the share of agriculture in GDP and share of 
agriculture in employment from 1950-51 to 2014-15. The share of agriculture in GDP in 
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1950-51 was 56.7%, while its share in total employment was 85% for the same period. The 
share of agriculture in GDP fell sharply and by 2014-15 it was 13%, while the fall in the 
share in the agricultural employment was much slower (55%) and more than half of the 
population still depends on agriculture for their livelihood as shown in Table 2.   
  
Year 
Share of agriculture in GDP at 
1999-2000 prices (%) 
Share of agriculture in 
employment (%) 
1950-51 51.9 85.0 
1960-61 47.6 77.3 
1970-71 41.7 63.9 
1980-81 35.7 60.0 
1990-91 29.5 58.1 
2000-01 22.3 57.3 
2005-06 18.3 56.7 
2010-11 14.6 56.0 
2013-14 13.9 55.4 
2014-15 13.4 55.0 
 
Table 2: Share of Agriculture in GDP and Employment in India. 
Source: National Sample Survey various years, Central Statistical Organisation, Government 
of India, New Delhi. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of agriculture in total GDP at constant prices of 2004-05 (in %), 1950-2015. 
Source: Computed from the the Planning Commission data, Government of India, various 
years. (accessed on 12 December 2017) 
 
However, a dramatic change in the performance of the agricultural sector was seen soon after 
the independence when it grew at the rate of 2.6% annually between 1950 and 1965, far more 
than during the pre-independence period (Siddiqui, 2014). The main reason for this 
development can be attributed to land reforms, especially the removal of absentee 
landlordism and the increase in public investment. However, public investment began to 
decline in the early 1980s and private investment fell as well. For the last five or six years, 
agricultural investment as a percentage of total investment has remained unchanged i.e. it was 
6.7% in 2009-10 and 6.5% in 2012-13 (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2015). 
 
Between 1993 and 2013, the share of the agriculture sector in GDP declined from 25% to 
merely 14%, while the share of total employment declined from two-thirds to less than one-
half. This means that GDP per capita in agriculture sector has been only one-tenth of GDP 
15 
 
per capita in the non-agriculture sector for the past twenty-five years. The share of 
manufacturing in GDP reached its peak of 17.3% in 1980 and remained around 16% until 
1995 and further declined to 12.9% in 2015 (Nayyar, 2017). 
 
Family division and fragmentation of land holdings has also led to low investment and thus 
low employment creation. Small plots of land under cultivation are unable to achieve 
economies of scale. In the absence of employment in the organised sector, the surplus rural 
workers, who are mostly unskilled, often migrate to seek employment in the informal sector 
to cities such as Mumbai or Delhi or to other states in Punjab and Haryana to earn an 
additional income. Despite all the hardship and uncertainty faced by small farmers, they have 
not completely given up their only secure source of livelihood, namely their land. (Siddiqui, 
2012) A meagre plot of land may not provide a livelihood throughout the year, but may act as 
a valuable fall-back option (Balakrishnan, 2010). Agriculture continues to be a lifeline for 
more than half of India’s population and government action through appropriate public 
policies has been crucial to ensuring the healthy performance of this sector over the decades 
since independence. 
 
The share of public investment in the agricultural sector has declined since 1991. The 
percentage of gross capital formation (GCF) in the agricultural and allied sectors of the total 
GCF of the Indian economy showing a long-term decline from 45% in 1980-81, to 22% in 
1990-91 and just 7% in 2010-11 (CSO, 2015). Under WTO pressure, in the name of global 
competition, Indian agriculture was exposed to global competition, and earlier protection 
such as agricultural support prices, input subsidies and public extension services were 
gradually reduced. Moreover, stagnation and even decline in the international commodity 
prices meant that Indian farmers had to work within a highly uncertain global environment.  
 
Due to globalisation and the increased integration of the Indian economy into global markets, 
global finance has become more important for local big businesses. Financial capital is 
opposed to debt-financed spending by the government. The government views deficit 
financing as increasing the liquidity overhang in the system and therefore being potentially 
inflationary. Inflation would erode the real value of financial assets. Another crucial point is 
that debt-financing by the state can legitimise and provide an important role for the state, but 
this development would undermine the role of the market, which is anathema to global 
finance. As Patnaik observes:  
“Any state action that operates independently of finance capital, that seeks to work 
directly instead of working through the promotion of corporate-financial interests, 
undermines the social legitimacy of capitalism, and especially of these corporate-
financial interests, for it raises the question: if the state is required to fix the system, 
then why do we need to system at all, why not simply have state ownership as such?” 
(Patnaik, 2013b:19) 
 
According to official estimates India’s GDP share increased from 4.8% of world GDP in 
2001 to 7% by 2016. This led to euphoric claims that India was emerging as a global 
economic power. However, the Indian economy remains among the poorest in the world. For 
instance, its per capita income (on a PPP basis) was estimated at just $5214 in 2013. The 
infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births was 41.1 in 2013. Nearly two million children die 
there every year with over one-quarter (28%) of those deaths linked to unsafe drinking water 
and poor sanitation (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2015).  
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The proponents of neoliberal reforms argue that India has not only managed to escape from 
the low-growth trap, which persisted until mid-1980s, but has managed to achieve higher 
growth rates. The figures do support such claims. For example, from 1950 to 1964, India’s 
GDP grew on average 4.8% per annum; in 1965-74 this was 3.4%, and in 1975-1984, 4.2%. 
This rose to 5.9% in 1985-1995 and 7.2% between 1996 and 2014. The other success that 
India has seen is the building up of a large foreign exchange reserve, which has currently 
risen to US$ 360 billion, equivalent to 11 months by current standards. Of course, this 
represents a remarkable development compared to 1991, when its foreign currency reserve 
had fallen to the value of its imports to just two weeks and it had to pledge its gold reserves to 
borrow money temporarily from the IMF to pay for its balance of payments (Nayyar, 2017). 
 
It was assumed that as a result of neoliberal reforms, Indian manufacturing would be a 
leading sector and it would grow quickly due to increased competition and the availability of 
new technologies and global markets (Girdner and Siddiqui, 2008). This did not happen. (See 
Figure 3) In 2010, industry’s contribution to GDP was 47% in China, 39% in South Korea, 
47% in Indonesia, 44% in Malaysia, and 45% in Thailand while in India, industry contributed 
only 27%. India also failed to diversify the commodities composition of its exports, and its 
traditional exports continue to dominate. In recent years, its exports have fallen in absolute 
terms (See Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 3: World’s Top 10 Manufacturing Nations in 2000 and 2010. 
Source: UNIDO’s International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 2012. 
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Figure 4: Annual Merchandise Export Growth Rate for India and the World from 2001 to 
2015. 
Source: R. Nagaraj, 2017, p63. 
 
In India, the output in the organised manufacturing sector
3
 has increased since pro-market 
reforms were introduced while during the same period the total number of workers in the 
organised manufacturing sector rose by only 0.9% annually from 1981 to 2005. The gross 
value added (GVA) in the manufacturing sector rose by 6% annually during the above period 
at 2004-05 prices. (Bhalotra, 1998) In other East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore (Siddiqui, 2016c) and more recently in China, the rapid 
expansion of manufacturing has absorbed the surplus labor force from the rural areas. 
However, in India, despite the high GDP growth rates, employment creation was negligible 
(NCEUS, 2009). Hence, this growth did not lead to employment generation. Bhalotra (1998) 
found that employment depends on expected cyclical changes in demand, productivity 
growth, and scale of production, hourly wages and hours of work. Her study, using state and 
industry-wise ASJ data sets, also found a significant negative correlation between the number 
of workers and hours of work between 1979 and 1988.  
 
The National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS) Report (2009) 
provides estimated figures for the employment of formal and informal workers in organised 
and unorganised sector in the entire economy of India, including the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. The study emphasises the significant employment growth during the 
1999 and 2005. Formal employment rose gradually from 33.6 million to 35 million, while 
employment in the organised sector increased rapidly from 54.9 million to 62.6 million. The 
report suggested that “the entire increase in the employment in the organised sector over this 
period has largely been informal in nature”. (NCEUS, 2009: 14) A number of studies have 
found that despite the rapid growth in GDP, employment generation in the organised 
manufacturing sector was far less impressive. This was due to a number of reasons including: 
adoption of capital-intensive techniques, the extension of working hours per day and the 
increase in man-days and changes in production in favour of less labor-intensive industries 
(Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2015). 
 
7. Poverty and Inequality 
 
It is important to analyse the outcomes of GDP growth on poverty and inequality since the 
adoption of neoliberal reforms. Some economists suggest that India’s growth performance 
has been spectacular and that it has also made impressive gains in reducing poverty, while 
inequality has risen at modest levels (Anand and Thampi, 2016). However, critics argue that 
the nature of development has been far from inclusive, that poverty has not decreased and 
that growth has accompanied by a huge increase in inequality (Balakrishnan, 2010).  Poverty 
continues to be a major source of concern if we look at non-income dimensions of poverty 
such as access to schools, health care, energy and transport. 
 
In India, the official procedure for setting the poverty line was based on consumption 
expenditure at which a specified calorie norm of nutritional intake is observed to be actually 
in some reference year which is taken as the base year. However, such estimates do not take 
into account the fact that the choice of base year is essentially an arbitrary one. The choice of 
                                                          
3
 Officially the organised sector is defined as those industries employing 10 or more workers using power and 
those employing 20 or more workers without using power.   
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an early year as a base year yields a favourable trend with a relatively declining headcount 
ratio of poverty. If we change the base year then we tend to get rising poverty rates.  
 
The per capita food grain absorption data is defined as net output minus net increase in 
stocks. The per capita food grain absorption by the end of the 19
th
 century was 200 kg 
annually. However, this declined sharply to less than 150 kg by the mid-20
th
 century (Blyn, 
1966). According to FAO estimates, this figure began to increase gradually after 
independence and it reduced to 180 kg in 1990, but begins to decline soon after and in 2008 it 
declined to only 156 kg. At present the government estimate is based on overall per capita 
consumption expenditure level at which these calorie intakes are achieved. This is defined as 
the ‘poverty line’ and calculated for a particular base year. This new official method of 
estimation differs from the earlier one, which estimated how many people have access to less 
than the stipulated calories and defined them as living below the poverty line. The official 
arguments are that food grain consumption declines as levels of income rise and people tend 
to diversify consumption away from food grains and spend money on other goods due to 
changing tastes and health care. 
 
As shown in Table 3 below, the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) estimated the 
official state-wise percentage of rural population from the calorie norms for the period of 
2004-05 and 2014-15. Data indicate that in most Indian states, the calorie intake declined 
between 2004-05 and 2014-15, the only exceptions being Kerala and West Bengal. In Delhi, 
a slight decrease was witnessed, while the fall was much higher in Madhya Pradesh and 
Maharashtra. Overall, at national level, calorie consumption declined from 79.8 to 77.2 for 
the same period (see Table 3). As Prabhat Patnaik argues, “It is clear from the Indian 
experience that the period of high growth has actually witnessed an increase in hunger in the 
country. And since poverty in India, as elsewhere, is defined with respect to a minimum 
nutritional intake, there has been an increase in absolute poverty in the country. Indeed, the 
proportion of persons both in rural and in urban India falling below a certain daily calorie 
consumption norm has actually increased during the period of high growth” (Patnaik, 
2013a:10). 
 
 
State 2004-05 2014-15 
Andhra Pradesh 83.3 72.5 
Assam 84.1 86.5 
Bihar 78.2 78.8 
Chhattisgarh 84.1 81.6 
Delhi 81.9 81.1 
Gujarat 84.3 88.5 
Haryana 67.3 68.6 
Himachal Pradesh 65.9 50.0 
Jammu and Kashmir 65.3 57.1 
Jarkhand 85.5 81.2 
Karnataka 89.8 82.6 
Kerala 79.6 81.8 
Madhya Pradesh 87.0 75.9 
Maharastra 86.5 77.8 
Odisha 77.6 77.8 
Punjab 67.1 62.7 
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Rajasthan 73.6 65.7 
Tamil Nadu 88.2 87.5 
Uttar Pradesh 73.0 76.4 
Uttarakhand 74.3 51.6 
West Bengal 77.7 79.4 
India 79.8 77.2 
Table 3: Percentage of Indian Rural Population below the Calorie Norms, 2004-05 and 2014-
15, State-wise in India. 
Source: Calculation/estimation based on NSSO data, New Delhi, Government of India. 
 
In terms of the social indicators India’s performance has been bad of 188 countries compiled 
by the UNDP, India is ranked 130. The UNDP statistics show that nearly 48% of India’s 
children aged five or under are malnourished. Public expenditure on health is meagre i.e. 
1.3% of the GDP in 2015. India cannot become modern nation if its lowest income groups 
have no access to health. Compared to India, the figure for China’s public spending on health 
is 3%, more than double that of India while the average figure for western European countries 
is 8% of GDP (Siddiqui, 2016a). 
 
Nearly 40% of India’s population fall into the lowest income group and a high proportion of 
these are Dalits (also known as untouchables), or belong to tribal or religious minorities, 
particularly Muslims (Siddiqui, 2017b; 2017c). Due to poverty, the poor schooling and health 
of their young people puts them at a disadvantage in the job market. Good quality education 
and health care are beyond their means and these negative factors affect their earning 
potential. In fact, all these factors have certainly given rise to the widespread social unrest 
witnessed during the last twenty-five years. Moreover, the skewed income distribution will 
lead to further deterioration in aggregate demand and growth potential will be adversely 
affected.  
 
The inequality in distribution of wealth since 1991 in India is shown in Table 4. The Gini 
Coefficient of total assets was as high as 0.74 and 0.75 respectively in 2014. These 
coefficients increased by as much as 8 percentage points between 2002 and 2014. Data 
indicates that there has been massive increase in wealth inequality since 2002. Anand and 
Thampi (2016) conclude that, in both rural and urban areas, inequality has exacerbated for the 
last decades. In recent decades in India, the top 10% holds at least 70% of the wealth in 2016. 
Forbes’ list of US dollar billionaires confirms this. For example, India had only two 
individuals in that list in 1995, but this number rose to 46 in 2012 and 55 in 2014. In the most 
recent list, Forbes (2016) claims that Indian numbers have reached 100. 
 
 Rural Urban Total 
 1991 2002 2014 1991 2002 2014 1991 2002 2014 
Total 
assets 
0.62 0.63 0.67 0.73 0.71 0.77 0.65 0.66 0.74 
Net 
worth 
0.62 0.63 0.68 0.74 0.72 0.78 0.66 0.67 0.75 
Table 4: Gini Coefficient by Sector in India, 1991-2014 
Source: Reproduced from Anand and Thampi, 2016:61; 48
th
, 59
th
 and 70
th
 rounds of All India 
Debt and Investment Survey (AIDIS). 
 
Although child malnutrition rates in India have declined rapidly during the past decade, they 
still rank amongst the world’s highest. Nearly 48% of children under-fives in India had 
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stunted or below average growth for their age in 2006. This had dropped to 39% in 2014, but 
that still represents over 47 million children. Malnourishment not only has physical effects 
but also leads to delays in the development of cognitive skills. If malnutrition rates continue 
to decline, India, which is currently lagging behind several poorer African countries, will 
achieve similar rates to those found in Ghana or Togo by 2030 (Lomborg, 2016). 
 
The on-going dispossession of India’s rural sector, for instance, via income deflation imposed 
on rural society makes even simple reproduction difficult to maintain. The on-going crisis in 
the agricultural sector, has led to the loss of over 200, 000 lives due to farmer suicides in the 
last two decades. It is clear evidence of income deflation which is the direct result of the 
adoption of neo-liberal economic policy, meaning that the state is no longer able to support 
farmers against encroachments of big capital, in order to retain the confidence of global 
financial capital.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
In 1991, India made a U-turn in matters of economic policy, especially regarding the role of 
the state in economic development. In the 1950s, the prevailing idea in government circles 
shifted from a belief that the state could do nothing wrong to a belief that it could do nothing 
right. The current prevailing ideology is that neoliberal policy is the only option and this 
prosperity will ultimately trickle down to the poor (Siddiqui, 2012). However, according to 
Yeldan (2006), the IMF-led SAP has created a new international division of labor, where 
industrialization and self-reliance has been abandoned. Whilst domestic markets are 
integrated with global markets under marginalised conditions and as a result the domestic 
economy has become more vulnerable to external shocks. 
 
The policy objective of the governments’ macroeconomic policy must be growth with higher 
levels of employment. The problem is accentuated by the mainstream orthodoxy, which 
advocates a restrictive fiscal policy and a tight monetary policy. Fiscal austerity means cuts in 
public expenditure, welfare and social spending, which undermines growth. The tight 
monetary policy has an adverse impact on growth as higher interest rates discourage private 
investors.  
 
The study has argued that the twenty-five years under neoliberal reforms show some positive 
changes in India’s economy such as GDP growth rates, FDI, and improvement in the balance 
of payments situation. It seems that the government is happy to proclaim that FDI has risen 
and the balance of payments has improved, and that more imported consumer goods are 
available on the market, but most of people have not seen any benefits. The agricultural 
sector has suffered its worst crisis during recent decades, reflected in the rise in farmers’ 
suicides.  
 
This study contributes with the highlighting the importance of agriculture sector and the 
importance of linkages between agriculture and industries, which has been neglected so far, 
by focusing of GDP growth under the neoliberal policy in India. Further this study has argued 
that the manufacturing sector has not picked up, despite the adoption of pro-market policies 
and the availability of cheap labor and natural resources for labor-intensive exports. The 
manufacturing sector’s share in the GDP has stagnated, and its share of merchandise exports 
has declined, while imports have risen sharply. This is not to suggest that India should go 
back to the pre-liberal period of import substitution industrialisation. However, policy change 
is required to assist the manufacturing sector and exports through developmental state policy. 
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This almost stagnation in industrial growth has meant dismal employment generation, while 
at the same time the expansion of the highly capital-intensive services sector, especially 
information technology, has led to very low rates of employment generation. The information 
technology industries have necessarily been confined to a narrow highly educated 
professional segment of the population.  
 
The study found that India’s progress towards industrialisation has been disappointing and 
the optimism that foreign capital and technology would bring efficiency and boost growth of 
manufacturing has been proved incorrect. In fact, manufacturing is very important for a 
country like India, where rapidly growing manufacturing besides earning foreign capital, can 
utilise labour, increase productivity and incomes through linkages and spill overs in the other 
sectors. 
 
The neoliberal reforms overlooked the agriculture sector and this seems to be a deliberate 
policy as the government was keen to sort out balance of payments crisis and seems to have 
no long term strategy. This decision was difficult to understand, as in Indian economy, about 
two-thirds of the workforce was directly or indirectly employed in agriculture sector and also 
more than three-quarter of the poor live in the rural areas. The economic reforms did not take 
into consideration this very important sector.  
 
This study concludes that despite higher growth, employment creation has been dismal, 
poverty persists and inequality has risen since the launch of economic liberalisation. The 
Indian economy now confronts a deepening crisis in the agriculture and in manufacturing 
sector, which could undermine any future growth prospects. Therefore, the sector needs 
massive investment especially in irrigation and soil conservation. The study has also argued 
that the growth in employment opportunities can help to provide a solution to India’s 
problems, particularly to revive growth by enlarging domestic demands and reducing 
inequality. 
 
An alternative economic policy should be based on raising incomes of agricultural workers, 
expanding domestic markets, reviving public investment in crucial areas such as irrigation, 
education and health. Such measures would eliminate illiteracy and improve health and will 
raise productivity. To ensure a level playing field it is important for the state to intervene to 
create efficient markets. India needs to redefine the role of the state for economic 
development and the country needs an interventionist policy. By this, I do not mean blanket 
state support as in the past, but a strategic policy to support industry and agriculture.  
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